The United States bombing of Lybia,
code-named Operation El Dorado Canyon, comprised air strikes by
the United States against Libya on Tuesday 15 April 1986.
The attack was carried out by the U.S. Air Force, U.S.
Navy and U.S. Marine Corps via air strikes, in retaliation for
the West Berlin discotheque bombing ten days earlier. There were 40
reported Libyan casualties, and one U.S. plane was shot down.
One of the claimed Libyan deaths was
of a baby girl, reported to be Muammar Gaddafi's daughter, Hana
Gaddafi. However, there were doubts as to whether she was really killed,
or whether she really even existed.
Libya represented a high priority
for President Ronald Reagan shortly after his 1981 inauguration.
Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi was firmly anti-Israel and had
supported violent organizations in the Palestinian territories and
Syria. There were reports that Libya was attempting to become a nuclear
power and Gaddafi's occupation of Chad, which was rich in uranium,
was of major concern to the United States.
Gaddafi's ambitions to set up a
federation of Arab and Muslim states in North Africa were alarming to U.S.
interests. Furthermore, then-Secretary of State Alexander Haig wanted
to take proactive measures against Gaddafi because he had been using
former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives to help set up
terrorist camps (most notably Edwin P. Wilson and Frank E.
Terpil).
After the December 1985 Rome and
Vienna airport attacks, which killed 19 and wounded approximately 140, Gaddafi
indicated that he would continue to support the Red Army Faction,
the Red Brigades, and the Irish Republican Army as long as the
European governments supported anti-Gaddafi Libyans. After years of occasional
skirmishes with Libya over Libyan territorial claims to the Gulf of Sidra,
the United States contemplated a military attack to strike targets within the
Libyan mainland.
In March 1986, the United States,
asserting the 12-nautical-mile (22 km; 14 mi) limit to territorial
waters according to international law, sent a carrier task force to the region.
Libya responded with aggressive counter-maneuvers on 24 March that led
to a naval engagement in the Gulf of Sidra. On 5 April 1986, Libyan
agents bombed "La Belle" nightclub in West Berlin, killing three
people, including a U.S. serviceman, and injuring 229 people. West Germany
and the United States obtained cable transcripts from Libyan agents
in East Germany who were involved in the attack. More
detailed information was retrieved years later when Stasi archives
were investigated by the reunited Germany. Libyan agents who had carried out
the operation from the Libyan embassy in East Germany were identified and
prosecuted by Germany in the 1990s.
The attack mission against Libya had
been preceded in October 1985 by an exercise in which the 20th TFW stationed
at RAF Upper Heyford airbase in the UK, which was equipped
with F-111Es, received a top-secret order to launch a simulated attack
mission on 18 October, with ten F-111Es armed with eight 500-lb practice
bombs, against a simulated airfield located in Newfoundland, Canada south of CFB
Goose Bay. The mission was designated Operation Ghost Rider. The
mission was a full rehearsal for a long-range strike against Libya. The mission
was completed successfully, with the exception of one aircraft that had all but
one of its eight bombs hang up on one of its wing racks. The lessons learned
were passed on to the 48th TFW which was equipped with the newer "F"
models of the F-111.
Elements of the
then-secret 4450th Tactical Group (USAF) were put on standby to fly
the strike mission against Libya. Over 30 F-117s had already been
delivered to Tactical Air Command (USAF) and were operating from Tonopah
Test Range Airport in Nevada. Commanders in the North Africa/Mediterranean
theaters knew nothing about the capabilities of the F-117, or that the aircraft
even existed. Within an hour of the planned launch of the F-117s, the Secretary
of Defense scrubbed the stealth mission, fearing a compromise of the secret
aircraft and its development program. The air strike was carried out with
conventional U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force aircraft. The F-117 would remain
completely unknown to the world for several more months, before being unveiled
in 1988 and featured prominently in media coverage of Operation Desert
Storm.
For the Libyan raid, the United States
was denied overflight rights by France, Spain, and Italy as
well as the use of European continental bases, forcing the Air Force portion of
the operation to be flown around France and Spain, over Portugal and
through the Straits of Gibraltar, adding 1,300 miles (2,100 km) each
way and requiring multiple aerial refuelings. The French refusal
alone added 2,800 km and was imposed despite the fact that France had
itself been the target of terrorism directed by the Gaddafi government in
Libya. French president Mitterrand refused overflight clearance
because the United States was interested in limited action in Libya while
France was more interested in major action that would remove Gaddafi from
power. Another factor in the French decision was the United States' last-minute
failure to participate in a retaliatory air raid on Iranian positions after
the 1983 Beirut barracks bombings.
After several unproductive days of meeting with European and Arab nations, and
influenced by an American serviceman's death, Ronald Reagan, on 14 April,
ordered an air raid on the following Libyan targets:
Bab al-Azizia Barracks in Tripoli was Gadhafi's command and
control center for overseas operations.
Murrat Sidi Bilal in Tripoli was a training camp for naval commandos and combat
frogmen.
Mitiga International Airport was used by Ilyushin
Il-76 transports.
Jamahiriyah Guard barracks in Benghazi was an alternate command and control
headquarters for overseas operations, and contained a warehouse for storage of
MiG components.
Benina International Airport was used as a base by defending fighters.
Among operational United States tactical aircraft, only the General
Dynamics F-111 and the A-6 Intruder, possessed the ability to attack
at night with the required precision. Although the F-111s would be required to
fly from distant bases, they were essential to mission success, because the
eighteen A-6 available aboard USS Coral Sea (CV-43) and USS America (CV-66) could
not carry enough bombs to simultaneously inflict the desired damage on the five
targets selected.
Twenty-eight McDonnell
Douglas KC-10 Extenders and Boeing KC-135 Stratotankers took off
from RAF Mildenhall and RAF Fairford shortly after 19:00 on
14 April. These tankers would conduct four silent refueling operations over the
6,000 mi (9,700 km) round-trip route the F-111s would fly to target.
Within minutes the tankers were followed by twenty-four F-111F strike aircraft
of the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing, flying from RAF
Lakenheath and five EF-111A Ravens of the 20th Tactical
Fighter Wing from RAF Upper Heyford. Six F-111s and one EF-111 were
designated spares who returned to base after the first refueling was completed
without any system failures among the designated strike aircraft.
America was on station in the Gulf of Sidra, but Coral
Sea was preparing to leave the Mediterranean, and made a high-speed
return from Spain. Naval aviators were dismayed when pre-raid news
broadcasts eliminated any element of surprise by listing their mission times
and target areas. America's air group would strike targets in
downtown Benghazi and provide fighter and suppression support for the Air Force
bombers, while Coral Sea's planes would strike the Benina
airfield outside Benghazi and provide fighter and suppression support for the
Navy bombers. About 01:00, America launched six A-6
strike aircraft with Mark 82 bombs for the Jamahiriyah Guard barracks
and six A-7 strike support aircraft. Coral Sea, operating
east of America simultaneously launched eight A-6 and
six F/A-18. Additional fighters were launched for combat air patrol (CAP)
The raid began in the early hours of 15 April, with the stated objectives of
sending a message and reducing Libya's ability to support and
train terrorists. Reagan warned that "if necessary, [they] shall do
it again."Coordinated jamming by the EF-111s and EA-6B
Prowlers began at 01:54 (Libyan time) as the A-7s and F/A-18s began
launching AGM-88 HARM and AGM-45 Shrike for SAM
suppression. The attack began at 0200 hours (Libyan time), and lasted
about twelve minutes, with 60 tons of munitions dropped. The F-111
bombers' rules of engagement required target identification by both
radar and Pave Tack prior to bomb release to minimize collateral
damage. Of the nine F-111s targeting Bab al-Azizia,
only two placed
their GBU-10 Paveway II bombs on target. One F-111 was shot down
by a Libyan surface to air missile
(SAM) 6-7 miles before the Bab al-Azizia target. One F-111's bombs missed the barracks, striking
diplomatic and civilian sites in Tripoli, and narrowly
missing the French embassy. Only one of
the three F-111s assigned to Sidi Bilal released their GBU-10 bombs on
target. One of the six F-111s assigned to bomb the Tripoli airfield aborted its
mission with a terrain-following radar malfunction, but the remaining
five dropped BSU-49 high drag bombs destroying two Il-76 transport
aircraft. America's A-6s damaged the Jamahiriyah MiG assembly
warehouse and destroyed four MiG shipping crates. Two A-6s from Coral
Sea aborted their mission, but five A-6s with CBU-59 APAM cluster
bombs and one with Mk 82 bombs struck Benina airfield destroying three or four
MiGs, two Mil Mi-8 helicopters, one Fokker F27
Friendship transport, and one small straight-wing aircraft.Some Libyan
soldiers abandoned their positions in fright and confusion, and officers were
slow to give orders. Libyan anti-aircraft fire did not begin until after the
planes had passed over their targets. No Libyan fighters
launched, and HARM launches and jamming prevented any of the 2K12
Kub, S-75 Dvina, S-125 Neva/Pechora,
or Crotale SAM launches from homing.Within twelve minutes, all
United States aircraft were "feet wet" outbound over the
Mediterranean. Navy strike aircraft had been recovered aboard their carriers by
02:53 (Libyan time) and surviving Air Force planes, with the exception of one
F-111 which landed in Rota, Andalousia with an overheated engine, had
returned to Britain by 10:10 (Libyan time).
Casualties.
Forewarned by a telephone call, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and his family rushed out of their residence in the Bab al-Azizia compound moments before the bombs dropped. It was long thought that the call came from Malta's Prime Minister, Karmenu Mifsud Bonnici. However, Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi was the person who actually warned Gaddafi, according to Giulio Andreotti, Italy's foreign minister at the time, and to Abdel Rahman Shalgham, Libya's then-ambassador to Italy. Shalgham's statement was also confirmed by Margherita Boniver, foreign affairs chief of Craxi's Socialist Party at the time.According to medical staff in a nearby hospital, two dozen casualties were brought in wearing military uniforms, and two without uniforms. Total Libyan casualties were estimated at 60, including those at the bombed airbases. An infant girl was among the casualties; her body was shown to American reporters, who were told she was Gaddafi's recently adopted daughter Hana. However, there was and remains much skepticism over the claim. She may not have died; the adoption may have been posthumous; or he may have adopted a second daughter and given her the same name after the first one died.
Two U.S. Air Force captains—Fernando L. Ribas-Dominicci and Paul F. Lorence—were killed when their F-111 fighter-bomber was shot down over the Gulf of Sidra. In the hours following the attack, the U.S. military refused to speculate as to whether or not the fighter-bomber had been shot down, with Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger suggesting that it could have experienced radio trouble or been diverted to another airfield. The next day, the Pentagon had announced it was no longer searching for the F-111 believed to be downed by a Libyan missile. On 25 December 1988, Gaddafi offered to release the body of Lorence to his family through Pope John Paul II. The body, returned in 1989, was identified as Ribas-Dominicci's from dental records. An autopsy conducted in Spain confirmed that he had drowned after his plane was shot down over the Gulf of Sidra. Libya denies that it held Lorence's body. However, Lorence's brother said that he and his mother saw television footage of a Libyan holding a white helmet with the name "Lorence" stenciled on the back. Furthermore, William C. Chasey, who toured the Bab al-Azizia barracks, claimed to have seen two flight suits and helmets engraved with the names "Lorence" and "Ribas-Dominicci", as well as the wreckage of their F-111.